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Official Title and Summary Prepared by the Attorney General 
PUNISHMENT. SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES. 
CARJACKING. MURDER OF JUROR. 
LEGISLATIVE INITIATIVE AMENDMENT. 
• Adds murder during a caIjacking, murder resulting from a caIjacking kidnap and the intentional 
murder of a juror in retaliation for, or prevention of, the performance of the juror's official duties 
to the existing list of special circumstances for first-degree murder for which the death penalty or 
life imprisonment without the possibility of parole is authorized. 
• Joined to Proposition 196 (Chapter 478, Statutes of 1995). If both measures pass, murder by 
intentional discharge of firearm at persons from a motor vehicle is also added to the list of special 
circumstances. 
Summary of Legislative Analyst's 
Estimate of Net State and Local Government Fiscal Impact: 
• Probably minor additional state costs. 
Final Votes Cast by the Legislature on SB 32 (Proposition 195) 
Assembly: Ayes 59 
Noes 7 
Senate: Ayes 28 
Noes 2 
P~ 
Analysis by the Legislative Analyst 
Background 
First-degree murder is generally defined in state law 
as murder which is plamied in advance, or which takes 
place during certain other crimes, including robbery, 
kidnapping, rape, or arson. It is generally punishable by 
a sentence of 25-years-to-life imprisonment with the 
possibility of release from prison on parole. However, a 
conviction for first-degree murder results in a more 
severe sentence of death or life imprisonment without the 
possibility of parole if the prosecutor charges and the 
court finds that one or more "special circumstances" 
specified in state law apply to the crime. 
Currently, a first-degree murder resulting from a 
"carjacking"-taking a vehicle against the will of a driver 
or passenger by force or fear of force-is not such a 
special circumstance. However, state law specifies that 
carjackers can also be charged with robbery, which is a 
special circumstance crime. Consequently, under current 
law, a person convicted of first-degree murder during the 
commission of a carjacking and additionally convicted of 
robbery could be sentenced to death or life imprisonment 
without the possibility of parole. 
Similarly, a first-degree murder resulting from the 
kidnapping of an individual during a carjacking is not 
considered a special circumstance. Such offenders could 
be charged, as the law allows, with kidnapping as a 
special circumstance crime resulting in a sentence of 
death or life imprisonment without the possibility of 
parole. 
Finally, state law provides that the first-degree murder 
of a judge, prosecutor, or certain other public officials is a 
special circumstance punishable by a sentence of death 
or life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. 
However, the law does not provide such a penalty in the 
case of the first-degree murder of a juror. 
Proposal 
This measure adds first-degree murder during either a 
carjacking or a carjacking-kidnap to the list of special 
circumstances punishable by the death penalty or life 
imprisonment without the possibility of parole. This 
measure also specifies that the first-degree murder of a 
juror-either in retaliation for performing his or her 
official actions or to prevent the juror from carrying out 
his or her official duties-is a special circumstance. 
Fiscal Effect 
Because this measure increases the number of crimes 
for which the special circumstances for first-degree 
murder applies, it would result in longer prison terms for 
some offenders, thereby increasing state costs. However, 
state law already permits carjackers or 
carjack-kidnappers who commit first-degree murder to 
be charged with robbery or kidnapping, thereby 
subjecting them to the harsher penalties for special 
circumstance crimes. Thus, the changes in the law made 
by this measure explicitly listing those two crimes as 
special circumstances are likely to result in minor 
additional incarceration costs. 
The provision of this measure designating the 
first-degree murder of a juror as a special circumstance 
crime is likely to have little fiscal effect because such 
crimes occur infrequently. 
In summary, we estimate that the measure would 
probably result in minor additional state costs. 
For the text of Proposition 195 see page 56 
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Carjacking. Murder of Juror. 
Legislative Initiative Amendment. 
Argument in Favor of Proposition 195 
Proposition 195 updates California's death penalty law. 
In order to impose the death penalty or a sentence of life 
without possibility of parole, a defendant must be found 
guilty of first-degree murder and a special circumstance. 
First-degree murder includes various types of felony 
murder. Under the first-degree felony murder rule, when 
a criminal participant kills a non-participant during a 
robbery, carjacking, sexual assault crime, kidnapping or 
other listed felony, all criminal participants are guilty of 
first-degree murder. 
The list of special circumstances includes murders for 
financial gain, the victim was a law enforcement officer 
or firefighter, retaliatory murders of witnesses, 
prosecutors, or judges; and with two exceptions, all 
first-degree felony murders. 
The two categories of first-degree felony murders 
which are not currently special circumstances are 
carjacking and kidnapping-carjacking first-degree felony 
murders. All other first-degree felony murders are also 
special circumstances. Proposition 195 would make the 
law of first-degree felony murder conform with the law of 
special circumstances by adding these two categories to 
the list of special circumstances. 
As noted above, the current death penalty law covers 
retaliatory murders of witnesses, prosecutors, and 
judges, but does not include a retaliatory murder of a 
juror as a special circumstance murder. Murdering a 
juror because of his or her official actions is an equal 
outrage and should be treated as such. Proposition 195 
adds retaliatory first-degree murders of jurors to the 
special circumstance list. 
Proposition 195 is supported by Governor Wilson, the 
California District Attorneys Association, the California 
Peace Officers Association, the California State Sheriffs 
Association, the California Correctional Peace Officers 
Association, and the Doris Tate Crime Victims Bureau. 
Vote Yes on Proposition 195! 
STEVE PEACE 
Senator, 40th District 
PETER FRUSETIA 
Assemblyman, 28th District 
MICHAEL BRADBURY 
District Attorney of Ventura County 
Rebuttal to Argument in Favor of Proposition 195 
The death penalty has failed whenever and wherever it 
has been tried. Enactment of Proposition 195 would 
extend this failed policy, draining resources needed for 
our children's education and for improvement of human 
life. As voters, we have moral obligations to insist on 
more effective policies to safeguard the limited public 
resources needed to enhance our communities. Do not 
extend use of the death penalty, even in appearance. 
For too long, societies have experimented with death as 
an outlet for vengeance, or as a shortcut solution to 
difficult social problems. The experiment has failed, and 
our communities have suffered. The very existence of 
Proposition 195 attests to this. 
History shows that the threat of death, when used as a 
policy instrument inevitably erodes our collective vision 
of the dignity of the human person. The death penalty 
undermines the value of human life on which democracy 
rests, and tends to increase those same violent attitudes 
and actions that the policy seeks to prevent. 
We must use methods of preventing and penalizing 
violent crime which do not promote the attitudes 
underlying the wanton carjackings we abhor. Our 
policies should instead promote awareness that human 
life is a priceless gift endowed with inalienable value and 
dignity. 
RABBILEONARDI.BEE~ 
Los Angeles, CA 
JEANETIE G.ARNQUIST 
Director of Human Concerns 
Roman' Catholic Diocese of San Bernardino 
SAM REESE SHEPPARD 
Director, Murder Victims' Families for Reconciliation 
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Carjacking. Murder of Juror. 195 Legislative Initiative Amendment. 
Argument Against Proposition 195 
A NO Vote on Proposition 195 will improve public 
safety by re-focusing legislative attention on effective 
ways to actually prevent violence. 
Chiefs of police and law enforcement officers across the 
country publicly acknowledge that the death penalty 
does virtually nothing to prevent murder. In fact, 
attention to the death penalty diverts law enforcement 
resources from truly effective measures to reduce 
violence and make communities safer. The best steps to 
reduce crimes of all kinds include more neighborhood 
watch programs, improved police training, effective 
community policing, tough programs to reduce drug and 
alcohol abuse, early juvenile offender intervention 
programs, weapons control efforts, speedier trials, 
domestic violence programs, and better funded probation 
and parole services. 
The death penalty already diverts too many dollars 
from more worthy activities, and takes too much valuable 
time of police and courts. Because some 50 capital cases 
are investigated and prosecuted to effect a single 
execution, millions of dollars must be spent and countless 
hours of court time must be consumed to bring about 
infrequent executions many years after the crime. 
\lthough the death penalty may fascinate the media and 
the public, the high cost of any extension of it cannot be 
justified. 
Too much attention to the extreme punishment 
distracts policy makers and the public from the more 
critical daily task of preventing violence. It also burdens 
courts with lengthy death penalty trials and years of 
appeals. From the perspective of those who see crime up 
close on a daily basis, other priorities are more deserving 
of public attention and support. The sooner we order 
crime prevention priorities toward solutions with proven 
records of effectiveness, the sooner we will be able to 
make a serious dent in California's problems of violence. 
Knowledgeable prosecutors and attorneys have pointed 
out that this proposal would not add anything of 
substance to the law. It is nothing more than a cosmetic 
change. Let it be known that you want more effective 
attention to the problem of violence by voting NO on 
Proposition 195. 
SENATOR MILTON MARKS 
Chair, Senate Committee on Criminal Procedure 
RIGHT REVEREND JERRY A. LAMB 
Bishop of the Episcopal Diocese of Northern California 
MIKE FARRELL 
President, M, J & E Productions, Inc. 
Rebuttal to Argument Against Proposition 195 
The opponents of Proposition 195 fail to make any 
valid argument against the merits of this necessary 
change to California's Death Penalty Law. 
Instead, the opponents who are clearly philosophically 
opposed to the death penalty engage in a typical attack 
on the utility and wisdom of the death penalty. 
In truth, the death penalty is a deterrent. Those who 
are executed never kill again. Moreover, society rightly 
expects that those who commit the ·most aggravated 
murders may, after careful procedures are followed, 
forfeit their own lives for their heinous crimes. 
On three separate occasions in the last 25 years, 
California voters have overwhelmingly voted to support 
the death penalty. The opponents of 195 choose to ignore 
this mandate by making a misleading argument that is 
simply untrue. 
Proposition 195 simply updates the death penalty law 
by adding "carjacking" and "kidnapping-carjacking" 
first-degree felony murders to a list of special 
circumstances that make a criminal eligible for the death 
penalty. 
Also, while the current death penalty law covers 
retaliatory murders of witnesses, prosecutors, and 
judges, it does not include a retaliatory first-degree 
murder of a juror. PropositioI1 195 therefore adds this 
terrible crime to the special circumstance list. 
Contrary to the arguments of the opposition, the death 
penalty is supported by cops, prosecutors, and crime 
victims. That is why these same groups overwhelmingly 
support 195. 
The bottom line is that the opposition has no merit. 
Vote Yes on 195! 
SUSAN A. DAVIS 
Assemblywoman, 76th District 
JIM MORRISSEY 
Assemblyman, 69th District 
MICHAEL FERGUSON 
District Attorney of Nevada County 
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for investment earnings, order the payment of those earnings to comply with any 
rebate requirement applicable under federal law, and may otherwise direct the use 
and investment of those proceeds so as to maintain the tax-exempt status of those 
bonds and to obtain any other advantage under federal law on behalf of the funds 
of this state. 
8879.17. The Director of Transportation shall report annually to the Governor 
and the Legislature regarding the funds available for seismic retrofit projects and 
the expenditure of bond proceeds. 
Proposition 193: Text of Proposed Law 
This amendment proposed by Assembly Constitutional Amendment 17 
(Statutes of 1994, Resolution Chapter 110) expressly amends the Constitution by 
amending a section thereof; therefore, existing provisions proposed to be deleted 
are printed in eh iiteollt ty pe and new provisions proposed to be added are printed 
in italic type to indicate that they are new. 
PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO SUBDIVISION (h) OF 
SECTION 2 OF ARTICLE XIII A 
(h) (1) For purposes of subdivision (a), the terms "purchased" and "change of in 
ownership" shall not include the purchase or transfer of the principal residence of 
the transferor in the case of a purchase or transfer between parents and their 
children, as defined by the Legislature, and the purchase or transfer of the first 
$1,000,000 of the full cash value of all other real property between parents and 
their children, as defined by the Legislature. This subdivision shall apply to both 
voluntary transfers and transfers resulting from a court order or judicial decree. 
(2) (A) Subject to subparagraph (B), commencing with purchases or transfers 
that occur on or after the date upon which the measure adding this paragraph 
becomes effective, the exclusion established by paragraph (1) also applies to a 
purchase or transfer of real property between grandparents and their grandchild 
or grandchildren, as defined by the Legislature, that otherwise qualifies under 
paragraph (1), if all of the parents of that grandchild or those grandchildren, who 
qualify as the children of the grandparents, are deceased as of the date of the 
purchase or transfer. 
(B) A purchase or transfer of a principal residence shall not be excluded 
pursuant to subparagraph (A) if the transferee grandchild or grandchildren also 
received a principal residence, or interest therein, through another purchase or 
transfer that was excludable pursuant to paragraph (1). The full cash value of any 
real property, other than a principal residence, that was transferred to the 
grandchild or grandchildren pursuant to a purchase or transfer that was 
excludable Jlursuant to paragraph (1), and the full cash value of a principal 
residence that fails to qualify for exclusion as a result of the preceding sentence, 
shall be included in applying, for purposes of subparagraph (A), the one million 
dollar ($1,000,000) full cash value limit specified in paragraph (1). 
Proposition 194: Text of Proposed Law 
This law proposed by Senate Bill 103 (Statutes of 1995, Chapter 440) is 
submitted to the people in accordance with the provisions of Article II, Section 10 
of the Constitution. 
This proposed law adds a section to the Penal Code; therefore, new provisions 
proposed to be added are printed in italic type to indicate that they are new. 
PROPOSED LAW 
SECTION 1. Section 2717.9 is added to the Penal Code, to read: 
2717.9. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a prisoner who 
participates in a joint venture program is ineligible for unemployment benefits 
upon his or her release from prison based upon participation in that program. 
Proposition 195: Text of Proposed Law 
This law proposed by Senate Bill 32 (Statutes of 1995, Chapter 477) is 
submitted to the people in accordance with the provisions of Article II, Section 10 
of the Constitution. 
This proposed law amends a section of the Penal Code; therefore, existing 
provisions proposed to be deleted are printed in etl ikeollt ty pe and new provisions 
proposed to be added are printed in italic type to indicate that they are new. 
PROPOSED LAW 
SECTION 1. Section 190.2 of the Penal Code is amended to read: 
190.2. (a) The penalty for a defendant who is found guilty of murder in the 
first degree shall be death or eOlmnement imprisonment in the state prison for a 
term-of life without the possibility of parole in any eaee in which if one or more of 
the following special circumstances has been found under Section 190.4, to be 
true: 
(1) The murder was intentional and carried out for financial gain. 
(2) The defendant was ple~iollely convicted previously of murder in the first 
degree or second degree. For the purpose of this paragraph, an offense committed 
in another jurisdiction, which if committed in California would be punishable as 
first or second degree murder, shall be deemed murder in the first or second 
degree. 
(3) The defendant Me, in this proceeding, has been convicted of more than 
one offense of murder in the first or second degree. 
(4) The murder was committed by means of a destructive device, bomb, or 
explosive planted, hidden, or concealed in any place, area, dwelling, building, or 
structure, and the defendant knew, or reasonably should have known, that his or 
her act or acts would create a great risk of death to a human being one or more 
human beings. 
(5) The murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a 
lawful arrest Ot to pel feet, 01 attempt, or perfecting or attempting to perfect, an 
escape from lawful custody. 
(6) The murder was committed by means of a destructive device, bomb, or 
explosive that the defendant mailed or delivered, attempted to mail or deliver, or 
eatffle caused to be mailed or delivered, and the defendant knew, or reasonably 
should have known, that his or her act or acts would create a great risk of death 
to a human being one or more human beings. 
(7) The victim was a peace officer, as defined in Section 830.1, 830.2, 830.3, 
830.31,830.32,830.33,830.34,830.35,830.36, 830.37, 830.4, 830.5, 830.6, 830.10, 
830.11, or 830.12, who, while engaged in the course of the performance of his or 
her duties, was intentionally killed, and the defendant knew, or reasonably 
should have known, that the victim was a peace officer engaged in the 
performance of his or her duties; or the victim was a peace officer, as defined in 
the abo, e enllmel ated above-enumerated sections of the Penal Oode , or a former 
peace officer under any of sneh those sections, and was intentiollally killed in 
retaliation for the performance of his or her official duties. 
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(8) The victim was a federal law enforcement officer or agent, who, wt 
engaged in the course of the performance of his or her duties, was intention<. 
killed, and the defendant knew, or reasonably should have known, that the 
victim was a federal law enforcement officer or agent, engaged in the 
performance of his or her duties; or the victim was a federal law enforcement 
officer or agent, and was intentionally killed in retaliation for the performance of 
his or her official duties. 
(9) The victim was a firefighter, as defined in Section 245.1, who, while 
engaged in the course of the performance of his or her duties, was intentionally 
killed, and the defendant knew, or reasonably should have known, that the 
victim was a firefighter engaged in the performance of his or her duties. 
(10) The victim was a witness to a crime who was intentionally killed for the 
purpose of preventing his or her testimony in any criminal or juvenile proceeding, 
and the killing was not committed during the commission, or attempted 
commission, of the crime to which he or she was a witness; or the victim was a 
witness to a crime and was intentionally killed in retaliation for his or her 
testimony in any criminal or juvenile proceeding. As used in this paragraph, 
"juvenile proceeding" means a proceeding brought pursuant to Section 602 or 707 
of the Welfare and Institutions Code. 
(11) The victim was a prosecutor or assistant prosecutor or a former prosecutor 
or assistant prosecutor of any local or state prosecutor's office in this l!tate or any 
other state, or of a federal prosecutor's office, and the murder was intentionally 
carried out in retaliation for, or to prevent the performance of, the victim's 
official duties. 
(12) The victim was a judge or former judge of any court of record in the local, 
state, or federal system in the State of Oalifm nia, 01 in this or any other state of 
the United Statee, and the murder was intentionally carried out in retaliation 
for, or to prevent the performance of, the victim's official duties. 
(13) The victim was an elected or appointed official or former official of the 
federal government, or of a any local or state government of Oalifol hia, 01 of any 
loealol state government of aIry otheI etate in the United Statee this or any other 
state, and the killing was intentionally carried out in retaliation for, or to prevent 
the performance of, the victim's official duties. 
(14) The murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel, manifesting 
exceptional depravity. As ttti!ized used in this section, the phrase eepeeiaHy 
"especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel, manifesting exceptional depla,ity 
depravity" means a conscienceless, or pitiless crime which that is unnecessarily 
torturous to the victim. 
(15) The defendant intentionally killed the victim while lying in wait. 
(16) The victim was intentionally killed because of his or her race, co 
religion, nationality, or country of origin. 
(17) The murder was committed while the defendant was engaged in, or was 
an accomplice in, the commission of, attempted commission of, or the immediate 
flight after committing, or attempting to commit, the following felonies: 
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(i) 
(A) Robbery in violation of Section 211 or 212.5. 
W 
(B) Kidnapping in violation of Section 207 or, 209, or 209.5 . 
fui1 
(C) Rape in violation of Section 261. 
,m 
(D) Sodomy in violation of Section 286. 
M 
(E) The performance of a lewd or lascivious act upon the person of a child under 
the age of 14 years in violation of Section 288. 
m7 
(F) Oral copulation in violation of Section 288a. 
triB 
(0) Burglary in the first or second degree in violation of Section 460. 
mii1 
(H) Arson in violation of subdivision (b) of Section 451. 
fud ' 
(l) Train wrecking in violation of Section 219. 
(J) Mayhem in violation of Section 203. . 
(K) Rape by instrument in violation of Section 289. 
(L) Carjacking, as defined in S~ction 215. 
(18) The murder was intentional and involved the infliction oftorture. 
(19) The defendant intentionally killed the victim by the administration of 
poison. 
(20) The. victim was a juror in any court of record in the local, state, or federal 
system in this or any other state, and the murder was intentionally carried oUf in 
retaliation for, or to prevent the performance of, the victim's official duties. 
(b) Unless an intent to kill is specifically required under subdivision (a) for a 
special circumstance enumerated therein, an actual killer, as to whom sneh the 
special circumstance has been found to be true under Section 190.4, need riot 
have had any intent to kill at the time of the commission of the offense which is 
the basis of the special circumstance in order to suffer death or confinement in the 
state prison for ~ life without the possibility of parole. 
(c) Every person, not the actual killer, who, with the intent to kill, aids, abets, 
counsels, commands, induces, solicits, requests, or assists any actor in the 
commission of murder in the first degree shall 8ttffer be punished by death or 
eonfinement imprisonment in the state prison for a telm of life without the 
possibility of parole , in any ease in IIhieh if one or more of the special 
circumstances enumerated in subdivision (a) of this seetion has been found to be 
true under Section 190.4. 
(d) Notwithstanding subdivision (c), every person, not the actual killer, who, 
with reckless indifference to human life and as a major participant, aids, abets, 
'msels, commands, induces, solicits, requests, or assists in the commission of a 
ony enumerated in paragraph (17) of subdivision (a); which fel:tmy results in 
Lne death of some person or persons, and who is found guilty of murder in the first 
degree therefor, shall suffer be punished by death or eonfinement imprisonment in 
the state prison for life without the possibility' of parole , in any eMe ill whieh if a 
special circumstance enumerated in paragraph (17) of subdivision (a) oHhi:s 
seeiimt has been found to be true under Section 190.4. 
The penalty shall be determined as provided in this section and Sections 190.1, 
is&.£; 190.3, 190.4, and 190.5. 
SEC. 2. Section 190.2 of the Penal Code is amended to read: 
190.2. (a) The penalty for a defendant who is found guilty of murder in the 
first degree shall be death or eonfinement imprisonment in the state prison for a 
term-6f life without the possibility of parole in any ease in whieh if one or more of 
the following special circumstances has been found under Section 190.4; to be 
true: 
(1) The murder was intentional and carried out for financial gain. 
(2) The defendant was pleviotlsly convicted previously of murder in the first 
degree or second degree. For the purpose of this paragraph, an offense committed 
in another jurisdiction, which if committed in California would be punishable as 
first or second degree murder! shall be deemed niurder in the first or· second 
degree. . ' 
(3) The defendant has', in this proceeding, has been convicted of more than 
one offense of murder in the first or second degree: 
(4) The murder was committe a by means of a destructive device, bomb, or 
explosive planted, hidden, or concealed in any place, area, dwelling, building, or 
structure, and the defendant knew, or reasonably should have known, that his or 
her act or acts would create a great risk of death to a "tlman being one or more 
human beings. 
(5) The murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a 
lawful arrest 01 to pelfect, III attempt, or perfecting or attempting to perfect, an 
escape from lawful custody. 
(6) The murder was committed by means of a destructive device, bomb, or 
explosive that the defendant mailed or delivered, attempted to mail or deliver, or 
~ caused to be mailed or delivered, and the defendant knew, or reasonably 
should have known, that his or her act .or acts would create a great risk of death 
to a htllnltll being one or more human beings. , 
(7) The victim was a peace officer, as defined in Section 830.1, 830.2, 830.3, 
830.31,830.32,830.33,830.34,830:35,830.36, 830.37, 830.4, 830.5, 830.6, 830.10, 
'<30.11, or 830.12, who, while engaged in the course of the performance of his or 
r duties, was intentionally killed, and the defendant knew, or reasonably 
,ould have known, that the victim was a peace officer engaged in the 
performance of his or her duties; or the victim was a peace officer, as defined in 
the <'tho v e entlmel ated above-enumerated sections of the Penal Code, or a former 
peace officer under any of such those sections, and was intentionally killed in 
retaliation for the performance of his or her official duties. 
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(8) The victim was a federal law enforcement officer or agent; who, while 
engaged in the course of the performance of his or her duties, was intentionally 
killed, and the defendant knew, or reasonably should have known, that the 
victim was a federal law enforcement officer or agent; engaged in the 
performance of his or her duties; or the victim was a federal law 'enforcement 
officer or agent, and was intentionally killed in retaliation for the performance of 
his or her official duties. 
(9) The victim was a firefighter, as defined in Section 245.1, who, while 
engaged in the course of the performance of his or her duties, was intentionally 
killed, and the defendant knew, or reasonably should have known, that the 
victim was a firefighter engaged in the performance of his or her duties. 
(10) The victim was a, witness to a crime who was intentionally killed for the 
purpose of preventing his or her testimony in any criminal or juvenile proceeding, 
and the killing was not committed during the commission; or attempted 
commission, of the crime to which he or she was a witness; or the victim was a 
witness to a crime and was intentionally killed in retaliation for his or her 
testimony in any criminal or juvenile proceeding. As used in this. paragraph, 
"juvenile proceeding" means a proceeding brought pursuant to Section 602 or 707 
of the Welfare and Institutions Code. 
(11) The victim was a prosecutor or assistant prosecutor or a former prosecutor 
or assistant prosecutor of any local or state prosecutor's office in this lIt:tte or any 
other state, or of a federal prosecutor's office, and the ,murder was intentionally 
carried out in retaliation for, or to prevent the performance of, the victim's 
official duties. 
(12) The victim was a judge or former judge of any court of record in the local, 
state, or federal system in the State of Califm nia, III in this or any other state ttf 
the United States, and the murder was intentionally carried out in retaliation 
for, or to prevent the performance of, the victim's official duties. 
(13) The victim was an elected or appointed official or former official of the 
federal government, or of a any local or state government of Califolnia, Ol of any 
loealol state govelnment of any othel state in the United States this or any other 
state, and the killing was intentionally carried out in retaliation for, or to prevent 
the performance of, the victim's official duties. 
(14) The murder was especially heinous,atrocious, or cruel, manifesting 
exceptional depravity. As tttihzed used in this section, the phrase espeeiaJly 
"especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel, manifesting exceptional deplavity 
depravity" means a consaienceless ; or pitiless crime whieh that is unnecessarily 
torturous to the victim. 
(15) The defendant intentionally killed the victim while lying in wait. 
(16) The victim was intentionally killed because of his'or her race, color, 
religion, nationality, or country of origin. 
(17) The murder was committed while the defendant was engaged in, or was 
an accomplice in, the commission of, attempted commission of, or the immediate 
flight after committing, or attempting to commit, the following felonies: 
(i) 
(A) Robbery in violation of Section 211 or 212.5. 
W 
(BJ Kidnapping in violation of Section 207 or, 209, or Z09.5 . 
fui1 
(C) Rape in violation of Section 261. 
tm 
(D) Sodomy in violation of Section 286. 
M 
(E) The performance of a lewd or lascivious act upon the person of a child under 
the age of 14 years in violation of Section 288. 
m7 
(F) Oral copulation in violation of Section 288a. 
triB 
(G) Burglary in the first or second degree in violation of Section 460. 
mii1 
(H) Arson in violation of subdivision (b) of Section 451. 
fud 
(l) Train wrecking in violation of Section 219, 
(J) Mayhem in violation of Section 203. 
(~) Rape by instrument in violation of Section 289. 
(L) Carjacking, as defined in Section 215. 
(18) The murder was intentional and involved the infliction of torture. 
(19) The defendant intentionally killed the victim by the administration of 
poison. 
(20) The victim was a juror in any court of record in the local, state, or federal 
system in this or any other state, and the murder was intentionally carried out in 
retaliation for, or to prevent the performance of, the victim's official duties. 
(21) The murder was intentional and perpetrated by means of discharging a 
firearm from a motor vehicle, intentionally at another person or persons outside 
the vehicle with the intent to inflict death. For purposes of this paragraph, "motor , 
vehicle" means any vehicle as defined in Section 415 of the Vehicle Code. 
(b) Unless an intent to kill is specifically required under subdivision (a) for a 
special circumstance enumerated therein, an actual killer, as to whom sneh-the 
special circumstance has been found to be true under Section 190.4, need not 
have had any intent to kill at the time of the commission of the offense which is 
the basis of the special circumstance in order to suffer death or confinement in the 
state prison for a-term--ttf life without the possibility pf parole. 
(c) Every person, not the actual killer, who, with the intent to kill, aids, abets, 
counsels, commands, induces, solicits, requests, or assists any actor in the 
commission of murder ill the first degree shall 8ttffer be punished by death or 
e!lllfinement imprisonment in the state prison for a telm of life without the. 
possibility of parole, in any ease in whieh if one or more of the special 
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circumstances enumerated in subdivision (a) ofthis seetion has been found to be 
true under Section 190.4. 
(d) Notwithstanding subdivision (c), every person, not the actual killer, who, 
with reckless indifference to human life and as a major participant, aids, abets, 
counsels, commands, induces, solicits, requests, or assists in the commission of a 
felony enumerated in paragraph (17) of subdivisIon (a) ; which felony results in 
the death ·of some person or persons, and who is found guilty of mu~der in the first 
degree therefor, shall sttft'er be punished by death or confinement imprisonment in 
the state prison for life without the possibility of parole , in 1Ill)' cll8e in "hich if a 
special circumstance enumerated in paragraph (17) of subdivision (a) oHhis 
section has been found to be true under Section 190.4. 
The penalty shall be determined as provided in this section and Sections 190.1, 
TOO:£;.190.3, 190.4, and 190.5. 
SEC. 3. This act affects !In initiative statute and shall become effective only 
when submitted to and approved by the voters pursuant to subdivision (c) of· 
Section 10 of Article II of the California Constitution. 
SEC. 4. Section 2 of this bill incorporates amendments to Section 190.2 off 
Penal Code proposed by both this bill andSB 9. It shall only become operative 
(1) both this bill and SB 9 are submitted to and approved by the voters pursuant 
to subdivision (c) of Section 10 of Article II of the California Constitution and 
become effective on the same date, (2) each bill amends Section 190.2 of the Penal 
Code, and (3) this bill receives more affirmative votes from the voters than SB 9, 
in which case Section 1 of this bill shall not become operative. 
Proposition 196: Text of Proposed Law 
This law proposed by Senate Bill 9 (Statutes of 1995, Chapter 478) is submitted 
to the people in accordance with the provisions of Article II, Section 10 of the 
Constitution. 
This proposed law amends a section of the Penal Code; therefore, existing 
provisions proposed to be deleted are printed in stIikeout type and new provisions 
proposed to be added are printed in italic type to indicate that they are new. 
PROPOSED LAW 
SECTION 1. Section 190.2 of the Penal Code is amended to read: 
190.2. (a) The penalty for a defendant who is found ~ilty of murder in the 
first degree shltH-be is death or confinement imprisonment In the state prison for a 
term-of-life without the possibility of parole in all)' cIIse in which if one or more of 
the following special circumstances has been found under Section 190.4 ; to be 
true: 
(1) The murder was intentional and carried out for financial gain. 
(2) The defendant was ple~iousl, convicted previously of murder in the first 
degree or second degree. For the purpose of this paragraph, an offense committed 
in another jurisdiction, which if committed in California would be punishable as 
first or second degree murder, shall be deemed murder in the first or second 
degree. . 
(3) The defendant has been convicted in this proceeding been conneted of more 
than one offense cf murder in the first or second degree. 
(4) The murder was committed by means of a destructive device, bomb, or 
explosive planted, hidden, or concealed in any place, area, dwelling, building, or 
structure, and the defendant knew, or reasonably should have known, that his or 
her act or acts would create a great risk of death to a human being or human 
beings. . 
(5) The murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a 
lawful arrest or to perfect, or attempt to perfect, an escape from lawful custody. 
(6) The murder was committed by means of a destructive device, bomb, or 
explosive that the defendant mailed or delivered, attempted to mail or deliver, or 
came caused to be mailed. or delivered, and the defendant knew, or reasonably 
should have known, that his or her act or acts would create a great risk of death 
to a human being or human beings. 
(7) The victim was a peace officer, as defined in Section 830.1, 830.2, 830.3, 
830.31,830.32,830.33,830.34,830.35,830.36,830.37, 83D.4, 830.5, 830.6, 830.10, 
830.11, or 830.12, who, while engaged in the course of the performance of his or 
her duties, was intentionally killed, and the defendant knew, or reasonably 
should have known, that .the victim was a peace officer engaged in the 
performance of his or her duties; or the victim was.a peace officer, as defined in 
the abo.e enunlelated above-enumerated sections ofthe Penal Code, or a former 
peace officer under any of such those sections, and was intentionally killed in 
retaliation for the performance of his or her official duties. 
(8) The victim was a federal law enforcement officer or agent, who, while 
engaged in the course of the performance of his or her duties, was intentionally 
killed, and the defendant knew, or reasonably should have known, that the 
victim was a federal law enforcement officer or agent -; engaged in the 
performance of his or her duties; or the victim was a federal law enforcemint 
officer or agent, and was intentionally killed in retaliation for the performance of 
his or her official duties. 
(9) The victim was a firefighter, <IS defined in Section 245.1, who, while 
engaged in the course of the performance of his or her duties, was intentionally 
killed, and the defendant knew, or reasonably should have known, that the 
victim was a firefighter engaged in the performance of his or her duties. 
(10) The victim was a witness to a crime who was intentionally killed for the 
purpose of preventing his or her testimony in any criminal or juvenile proceeding, 
and the killing was not committed during the commission, or attempted 
commission, of the crime to which he or she was a witness; or the victim was a 
witness to a crime and was intentionally killed in retaliation for his or her 
testimony in any criminal or juvenile proceeding. As used in this paragraph, 
"juvenile proceeding" means a proceeding brought pursuant to Section 602 or 707 
of the Welfare and Institutions Code. 
(11) The victim was a prosecutor or assistant prosecutor, or a former prosecutor 
or a former assistant prosecutor 01 118sistant pi osecutol , of any local or state 
prosecutor's office in this state or any other state, or a of any federal prosecutor's 
office, and the murder was intentionally carried out in retaliation for, or to 
prevent the performance of, the victim's official duties. 
(12) The victim was a judge or former judge of any court of record in the local, 
state, or federal system in the State of Calif 01 nia, 01 in this or any other state of 
the United States, and the murder was intentionally carried out in retaliation 
for, or to prevent the performance of, the victim's official duties. 
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(13) The victim was an elected or appointed official, or a forme~ elected or 
former appointed official, of the federal government, of a local or state 
government of Clllifoinill this state, or of any local or state government of any 
other state in of the United States, and the kiHing murder was intentionally 
carried out in retaliation for, or to prevent the performance of, the victim's 
official duties. 
(14) The murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel, manifesting 
exceptional depravity. As utilized in this section, the phrase especilll!, "eseecially 
heinous, atrocious, or cruel, manifesting exceptional depIII'tt, depravity means 
a conscienceless., or pitiless crime which that is unnecessarily torturous to the 
victim. 
(15) The defendant intentionally killed the victim while lying in wait. 
(16) The victim was intentionally killed because of his or her race, color, 
religion, nationality, or country of origin. 
(17)' The murder was committed while the defendant was engaged in, or was 
an accomplice in, the commission of, attempted commission of, or the immediate 
flight after committing, or attempting to commit, the following felonies: 
ffi 
(A) Robbery in violation of Section 211 or 212.5. fiB . 
(B) Kidnapping in violation of Section 207 or 209. 
(iii7 
(C) Rape in violation of Section 261. 
6v1 
(D) Sodomy in violation of Section 286. M . 
(E) The performance of a lewd or lascivious act upon the person of a child und 
the age of 14 years in violation of Section 288. 
M? 
(F) Oral copulation in violation of Section 288a. 
fW1 
(G) Burglary in the first or second degree in violation of Section 460. 
\Tiii1 
(H) Arson in violation of subdivision (b) of Section 451. 
6x1 
(l) Train wrecking in violation of Section 219. 
(J) Mayhem in violation of Section 203. 
(K) Rape by instrument in violation of Section 289. 
(18) The murder was intentional and involved the infliction of torture. 
(19) The defennant intentionally killed the victim by the administration of 
poison. 
(20) The murder was intentional and perpetrated by means of discharging a 
firearm from a motor vehicle, intentionally at another person or persons outside 
the vehicle with the'intent to inflict death. For purposes of this paragraph, "motor 
vehicle" means any vehicle as defined in Section 415 of the Vehicle Code. 
(b) Unless an intent to kill is specifically required under subdivision (a) for a 
special circumstance enumerated therein, an actual killer, as to whom such the 
special circumstance has been found to be true under Section 190.4, need not 
have had any intent to kill at the time of the commission of the offense which is 
the basis of the special circumstance in order to Sttffer be punished by death or 
confinenlent imprisonment in the state prison for II telm of life without the 
possibility of parole. 
(c) Every person, not the actual killer, who, with the intent to kill, aids, abets, 
counsels, commands, induces, solicits, requests, or assists any actor in the 
commission of murder in the first degree shall StHfer be punished by death or 
confinement imprisonment in the state prison for a telm of life without the 
possibility of parole, in 1Ill)' cIIse in which if one or more of the special 
circumstances enumerated in subdivision (a) of this section has been found to be 
true under Section 190.4. 
(d) Notwithstanding subdivision (c), every person, not the actual killer, who, 
with reckless indifference to human life and as a major participant, aids, abets, 
counsels, commands, induces, solicits, requests, or assists in the commission of a 
felony enumerated in paragraph (17) of subdivision (a), which felony results in the 
death of some person or persons, and who is found guilty of murder in the first 
degree therefor, shall strlfer be punished by death or eonfinement imprisonment ,-
the state prison for life without the possibility of parole , in an, case in whieh ij 
special circumstance enumerated in paragraph (17) of subdivision (a) of-thto 
section has been found to be true under Section 190.4. 
The penalty shall be determined as provided in this section and Sections 190.1, 
TOO:£; 190.3, 19D.4, and 190.5. 
SEC. 2. Section 190.2 of the Penal Code is amended to read: 
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